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THE PECULIAR FEDERAL MARRIAGE 
AMENDMENT 
Scott Dodson t 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On July 14, 2004, on the Senate floor, the full Senate narrowly voted to 
reject cloture, 50-48, with two abstentions, on Senate Resolution 40, a 
proposed constitutional amendment to define marriage and its legal 
incidents in the United States. 1 This Federal Marriage Amendment, or 
FMA, states: 
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of 
a man and a woman. Neither this Constitution, nor the constitution 
of any State, shall be construed to require that marriage or the 
legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any union other than the 
union of a man and a woman.2 
t Adjunct Professor, The George Washington University Law School (2003-2004); 
Associate, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Washington, D.C. The views expressed herein are 
mine and do not necessarily reflect those of any other person or entity. 
1. See Vote on the Motion to Invoke Cloture on the Motion to Proceed to Consider S.J. 
Res. 40, http:/ /www.senate.gov/legislative!LIS/roll_ call_lists/roll_ call_ vote_ cfm.cfm?congress 
=108&session=2&vote=00155 (last visited Nov. 1, 2004) [hereinafter Cloture Vote]. The two 
abstentions were White House hopefuls John Kerry and John Edwards. !d. 
2. S.J. Res. 40, 108th Cong. § 2 (2004). The FMA appears to have substantial political 
support. Forty-eight Senators voted in favor of the Senate version on July 14, 2004. Cloture 
Vote, supra note 1. The companion House resolution, H.R.J. Res. 56, 108th Cong. (2003), 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?cl08:7:./temp/-cl081NMEfG:: (last visited Nov. 1, 
2004), which reads very similarly to the Senate version, has garnered 131 cosponsors since it 
was introduced. On February 24, 2004, President Bush formally endorsed a federal marriage 
amendment. See Bush Calls for Ban on Same-Sex Ma"iages, at http://www.cnn.com/2004/ 
ALLPOLITICS/02/24/elec04.prez.bush.marriage (last visited Aug. 11, 2004); see also 
Katharine Q. Seelye & Janet Elder, Strong Support Is Found for Ban on Gay Marriage, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 21, 2003, at Al (reporting President Bush's support for the FMA well before his 
formal announcement). A cynic may answer that the supporters are simply trying to score 
political points in an election year by supporting a social agenda that will likely never come to 
fruition. Cf Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutional Constancy: Why Congress Should Cure Itself 
of Amendment Fever, 17 CARDozo L. REv. 691, 697-704 (1996) (surmising that motivation). 
Perhaps, though, supporters are instead intent on persevering beyond the election year; the 
Senate version of the FMA omits the customary clause specifying a particular time (seven 
years) for successful ratification. Compare S.J. Res. 40, 108th Cong. § 2 (2004) (lacking the 
clause), with S.J. Res. 26, 108th Cong. (2003) (containing the clause). 
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The FMA's definition of marriage as between one man and one woman 
prevents states or the national government from extending the definition of 
marriage to include same-sex couples. It also prohibits states or the national 
government from constraining officials intent on denying same-sex couples 
the legal benefits of marriage.3 The FMA takes this power away from the 
states in derogation of individual liberty and equality. As a constitutional 
matter, that power shift is quite peculiar. Indeed, there is nothing like it in 
the Constitution.4 
Our Constitution is thematic. One theme is a commitment to state power 
and local democracy-what some term "federalism." In general, the 
national government has limited, specifically enumerated powers focusing 
on national issues, while all other powers are reserved to the people or the 
states. Unless the national government enacts positive, constitutional laws 
to the contrary, the people of the several states generally can use their state 
democratic processes to legislate their local affairs, such as the definition of 
marriage in their communities, and their state constitutional processes to 
establish the standards of their choice. This default constitutional balance of 
power in favor of the states assures the states plenary power over their local 
affairs and officials, except where superseded by positive federal law. 
Where the Constitution alters this balance by limiting state power, it 
usually does so only in furtherance of other recognizable themes. The 
themes of individual liberty and equality, for example, often trump state 
power. Under the Bill of Rights, as applied to the states through the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the states may not infringe 
freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and a host of protections for the 
criminally accused.5 The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment removes from the states much power to discriminate among 
citizens based on special classifications.6 The Voting Amendments prohibit 
states from discriminating among various classes in the fundamental right to 
3. Robert Bork's claim that the FMA merely guards against the prospect that the 
judiciary will legalize same-sex marriage without the express consent of the legislatures, see 
Robert H. Bork, Stop Courts from Imposing Gay Marriage, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2001, at A14, 
is untenable. The FMA would equally prohibit same-sex "marriages" made law by legislative or 
state constitutional processes. Also, although the FMA would not by its terms prohibit the 
people of a state from requiring that marital benefits be conferred upon same-sex couples by 
state constitutional amendment, it would prevent the courts from interpreting the amendment to 
have its intended effect. 
4. See infra Part III. 
5. See Scott Dodson, The Metes and Bounds of State Sovereign Immunity, 29 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 721, 762-63 (2001). 
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State ... 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."). 
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vote. 7 These provisions, and others, remove from the states some of their 
power to regulate, but they do so in furtherance of the themes of individual 
liberty and equality. 
The FMA is antithetical to each of these three themes. It is antithetical to 
federalism and state power because it removes from the states some of their 
power over marriage, a matter traditionally regulated by the states. It is 
antithetical to individual liberty because it abridges the fundamental right of 
consenting adults to marry whom they choose. And the FMA is antithetical 
to equality because it denies to a specified group the benefits and privileges 
of another group. No other provision in the Constitution is so contrary to the 
pervading themes of state power, liberty, and equality. 
In this essay, I discuss the Constitution's commitment to the three 
themes I have articulated-state power, individual liberty, and equality-
and then demonstrate how the FMA is uniquely contrary to all three. I do 
not intend to go so far as to suggest that the FMA would be an 
"unconstitutional amendment,"8 if such things are possible, nor do I mean to 
suggest that same-sex marriage is or should be affirmatively protected by 
the Constitution. I mean only to suggest that proposed amendments altering 
the Constitution's commitment to the theme of state power, especially in an 
area of traditional state regulation, should be scrutinized warily for thematic 
coherence with other strong constitutional values of liberty and equality. 
Because the FMA restricts state power over a subject traditionally reserved 
to state governance, and is inconsistent with other pervading themes of 
liberty or equality, the FMA would be a decidedly peculiar appendage to 
our modem Constitution. 
II. THEMES OF STATE POWER, LIBERTY, AND EQUALITY 
The Constitution is a thematic document. It exhibits a default 
commitment to state power in a traditional effort to leave matters of local 
7. See id. amends. XV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI. 
8. See, e.g., Everett V. Abbot, Inalienable Rights and the Eighteenth Amendment, 20 
COLUM. L. REv. 183, 185-87 (1920) (suggesting that the Eighteenth Amendment might violate 
an inalienable natural right to pursue happiness through alcohol); William L. Marbury, The 
Nineteenth Amendment and After, 7 VA. L. REV. 1, 2-3, 28-29 (1920) (arguing that the 
Nineteenth Amendment is unconstitutional because it deprives nonratifying states of their 
sovereign power to regulate elections); George D. Skinner, Intrinsic Limitations on the Power of 
Constitutional Amendment, 18 MICH. L. REV. 213, 218-23 (1920) (arguing that states cannot 
ratify amendments ceding power reserved to them by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments); Jeff 
Rosen, Note, Was the Flag Burning Amendment Unconstitutional?, 100 YALE L.J. 1073, 1073 
(1990) (arguing that the failed Flag Burning Amendment would have been an unconstitutional 
infringement on natural rights). 
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concern and local governance to the states. Where the Constitution (or the 
Supreme Court's interpretation of it) departs from that commitment to state 
power, it does so in furtherance of other recognizable themes, in particular, 
individual liberty and equality. The FMA, however, is antithetical to these 
themes; it takes power away from the states in a traditional area of state 
regulation and nationalizes a conception of marriage in contravention of 
both individual liberty and equality. 
A. Commitment to State Power in a Federal System 
The Constitution establishes a "dual sovereignty" by the states and 
federal government in which the states are sovereign participants in the vast 
governance of America.9 To enable meaningful state participation at the 
local level, the Constitution sets out the permissible national powers in a 
limited and enumerated fashion, 10 generally restricting the scope of federal 
regulation to national, foreign, and interstate matters. 11 Its very next section 
expressly carves out exceptions to these grants. 12 Finally, the Constitution 
makes even federal laws permitted under the Constitution nevertheless quite 
difficult to enact. 13 These provisions restrict national power in favor of a 
stronger commitment to plenary state power. 
And these are just the limitations imposed by the original Constitution. A 
Bill of Rights, according to many founders, was unnecessary because the 
Constitution's own limited and divided powers left those fundamental civil 
9. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991); Taffiin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 
(1990) ("We begin with the axiom that, under our federal system, the States possess sovereignty 
concurrent with that of the Federal Government, subject only to limitations imposed by the 
Supremacy Clause."). 
10. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. For a stark contrast between the limited nature of federal 
grants of power over state citizens and the plenary federal power over federal territories, 
compare id., with id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make 
all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the 
United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims 
of the United States, or of any particular State."). 
II. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, at 153 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(stating that the national government has three principal purposes: provide for the common 
defense, preserve domestic security, and maintain national and international commerce); id. at 
156 ("The POWERS are not too extensive for the OBJECTS of federal administration, or, in 
other words, for the management of our NATIONAL INTERESTS; nor can any satisfactory 
argument be framed to show that they are chargeable with such an excess."). 
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. 
13. Enactment requires majority approval in both Houses. !d. § 7, cl. 2. After bicameral 
passage, a bill becomes law if the President also approves. !d. If the President does not, the bill 
becomes law only upon a two-thirds approval in each House. !d. 
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liberties untouched and reserved to the states or the people. 14 But most 
states ratified with the insistence of a Bill of Rights to restrict national 
power even further. 15 The limitations on the powers granted to the federal 
governmentl6 imply that the states (and their citizenry) retain all other 
powers. 17 The Tenth Amendment makes this implication explicit. 18 
The states have more than mere "reserved" powers under the 
Constitution. The Constitution assumes the continued existence of the states 
as quasi-independent and autonomous political entities. 19 It also grants the 
states a special agency in the mechanics of the national government by, for 
example, providing that the states prescribe the times, places, and manners 
of congressional elections/0 giving the states an important role in the 
Electoral College/1 and mandating-at least originally-that Senators be 
chosen by state legislatures.22 Finally, the Eleventh Amendment embodies a 
14. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-87, at 536-
42 ( 1969). Alexander Hamilton wrote a spirited argument against inclusion of a Bill of Rights in 
the Constitution on the grounds that the Constitution already included substantial limitations on 
governmental power in favor of individual liberties; that a Bill of Rights was only necessary to 
reserve power from the rulers, whereas the Constitution was a limited grant of power to them; 
and that the limited nature of the powers in the Constitution were themselves an implied Bill of 
Rights. See THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at § 10-20 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961); see also WOOD, supra, at 539-43. 
15. See WOOD, supra note 14, at 542-43. 
16. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8 (specifying the limited powers of the national government); id 
§ 9 (excluding from the national government certain powers). 
17. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) ("The powers of the 
legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken or forgotten, the 
constitution is written."); THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292-93 (James Madison) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1961): 
!d. 
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal 
government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State 
governments are numerous and indefinite. . . . The powers reserved to the 
several States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of 
affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the 
internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State. 
18. U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people."). 
19. See Scott Dodson, Vectoral Federalism, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 393, 399-401 (2003). 
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 ("The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for 
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but 
the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of 
chusing Senators."). 
21. Id art. II,§ 1, cl. 2. 
22. !d. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 ("The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two 
Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years; and each Senator 
shall have one Vote."). 
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commitment to state sovereignty by protecting states from suits brought by 
private individuals in federal court.23 Thus, the Constitution exhibits 
specific commitments to state power, autonomy, and efficacy. 
The federalist balance of power between the state and national 
governments has a regular litany of normative benefits?4 Two are important 
here. First, autonomous and multiple local governments increase political 
diversity, which permits mobile citizens to choose a state which best suits 
their needs25 and permits states to experiment or borrow ideas from their 
sister states. 26 Second, allocating national issues to the national government 
and local issues to the states helps ensure that the issues are addressed by 
the government most efficiently or expertly able to address them.27 
The Constitution says nothing about marriage. It implicitly leaves the 
power to define marriage to the residuum of state authority. It may be that 
Congress even lacks the power to define marriage for the states, at least 
under the Commerce Clause. 28 The Court has suggested that this allocation 
23. Jd amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to 
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States 
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."). 
24. See Dodson, supra note 19, at 399-400. 
25. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (asserting that federalism "makes 
government more responsive by putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry"); Lynn 
A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51 
DUKE L.J. 75, 150 (2001) ("[I]mposition of a uniform national solution almost always will 
satisfy fewer people .... ");Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 
VA. L. REv. 1387, 1453 (1987) (asserting that variations among state regulations promote 
competitive markets for personal preference); Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. 
L. REv. 317, 387 (1997) (noting that "different governments can adopt a mix of policies that 
meet the preferences of different citizens, thus maximizing the way in which government as a 
whole satisfies individual preferences"); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and 
State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 8 (1988) (stating that 
federalism permits the citizens of "each region [to] create the type of social and political climate 
they prefer"); Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 
418-19 (1956). 
26. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458 (asserting that federalism "allows for more innovation 
and experimentation in government"); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 87-90 (1995); 
Friedman, supra note 25, at 397; John Ely Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 
54 COLUM. L. REv. 489, 540-42 (1954); Merritt, supra note 25, at 9. 
27. See Friedman, supra note 25, at 397, 401-02; cf United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 
580 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("If Congress attempts that extension, then at the least we 
must inquire whether the exercise of national power seeks to intrude upon an area of traditional 
state concern."); id at 583 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that a statute exceeding Congress's 
commerce power "forecloses the States from experimenting and exercising their own judgment 
in an area to which States lay claim by right of history and expertise"). 
28. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615-16 (2000) (stating that upholding 
the law, which the Court refused to do, would have allowed Congress to regulate family law and 
other areas of traditional state regulation); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564 (refusing to permit Congress 
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of power furthers normative benefits: the states are the better government to 
regulate family matters because of their traditional expertise with them and 
their close affiliation with local preferences.29 
In 1996, responding to the recognition that state-sanctioned same-sex 
unions were on the rise, Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Acf0 
("DOMA"), which defines marriage as between one man and one woman 
for federal law purposes and permits states to disregard other states' 
recognition of same-sex partner benefits.31 DOMA preserves the ability of 
the states to define marriage for their own citizenry.32 
As contemplated by the federalist structure, the states are perfectly 
capable of deciding for themselves what definitions of marriage will control 
in their states.33 Alaska constitutionally defined marriage as between one 
power under the Commerce Clause to "regulate any activity that it found was related to the 
economic productivity of individual citizens," such as "family law (including marriage, divorce, 
and child custody)"). 
29. See Akenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 704 (1992) (stating that "state courts are 
more eminently suited to [custody issues] than are federal courts, which lack the close 
association with state and local government organizations dedicated to handling issues that arise 
out of conflicts over divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees" and adding that "it makes far 
more sense to retain the rule that federal courts lack power to issue these types of decrees 
because of the special proficiency developed by state tribunals over the past century and a half 
in handling issues that arise in the granting of such decrees"). 
30. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996); 28 U.S.C. § 1738(c) (1996). 
31. 1 U.S.C. § 7; 28 U.S.C. § 1738(c). The Full Faith and Credit Clause states: "Full Faith 
and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of 
every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such 
Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." U.S. CONST. art. IV, 
§ 1. Whether DOMA is a permissible restriction of the Clause is a matter of some debate. 
Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 283(2) (1971) (stating that states 
need not recognize marriages from another state which conflict with the forum state's public 
policy), with, e.g., Paige E. Chabora, Congress' Power Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
and the Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, 76 NEB. L. REV. 604, 605-08, 650-52 (1997) 
(challenging Congress's power to restrict full faith and credit), and Julie L. B. Johnson, 
Comment, The Meaning of "General Laws": The Extent of Congress's Power Under the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause and the Constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act, 145 U. PA. L. 
REv. 1611, 1613-15 (1997) (doubting that DOMA represents "general laws"). Now that 
Massachusetts has legalized same-sex marriage, DOMA is likely to be challenged by same-sex 
couples wed in Massachusetts and seeking marriage benefits in other states. 
32. As the author of DOMA recently stated, "DOMA was meant to preserve federalism, 
not to dictate morals from Washington." Preserving Traditional Marriage: A View from the 
States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) (testimony of Bob 
Barr), http:/ /judiciary .senate.gov /print_ testimony .cfm?id= 1234&wit_ id=287 4. 
33. Other countries are also experimenting with same-sex unions. For example, France 
offers a Civil Solidarity Pact to same-sex and opposite-sex couples which grants some, but not 
all, marital benefits. Sarah Lyall, In Europe, Lovers Now Propose: Marry Me, a Little, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 15, 2004, at A3. Portugal, Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands offer 
Registered Partnerships which confer varying degrees of marital benefits. /d. 
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man and one woman in 1999,34 and twenty-six states in 2004 introduced or 
are expected to introduce constitutional amendments that would prohibit 
same-sex marriage.35 The Hawaii Constitution permits, but does not require, 
the preclusion of same-sex marriage.36 More than 170 state and local 
governments extend health benefits to same-sex partners of public 
employees.37 Vermont's Civil Union Act extends marriage benefits to "civil 
unions" between same-sex couples.38 California's domestic partnership 
statute permits same-sex couples to register as domestic partners and 
confers some benefits, such as hospital visitation rights, on domestic 
partners.39 In February 2004, San Francisco city officials became the first 
government officials in the United States in almost thirty years to grant 
same-sex marriage licenses. 40 And, famously, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Court held that the denial of a marriage license to same-sex couples violated 
the Massachusetts Constitution.41 
34. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25 ("To be valid or recognized in this State, a marriage may 
exist only between one man and one woman."). For more on the Alaska amendment, see 
generally Kevin G. Clarkson et al., The Alaska Marriage Amendment: The People's Choice on 
the Last Frontier, 16 ALASKA L. REv. 213 (1999). 
35. Joe Crea, State Lawmakers Embrace Anti-Gay Bills in '04 Session, WASH. BLADE, 
July 9, 2004, at 17. Ten states (Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Mississippi, 
Missouri, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Utah, and Wisconsin) passed constitutional amendments 
banning same-sex marriage in 2004 that now are subject to voter approval. The Louisiana, 
Oklahoma, Georgia, Utah, and Kentucky amendments would constitutionally ban civil union 
and domestic partnership rights to same-sex couples. Eleven states (Alabama, Arizona, Kansas, 
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, and Washington) considered, but 
failed to pass, constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage. Another five states 
(Arkansas, Michigan, Montana, North Dakota, and Oregon) are likely to put constitutional 
amendments on the voter ballot in 2004. !d. 
36. HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23 ("The legislature shall have the power to reserve marriage to 
opposite-sex couples."). The Hawaii legislature has statutorily granted same-sex couples marital 
benefits. HAW. REv. STAT. § 572C-l (Supp. 2003). For more on those events in Hawaii, see 
generally David Orgon Coolidge, The Hawaii Marriage Amendment: Its Origins, Meaning and 
Fate, 22 U. HAw. L. REv. 19 (2000). 
37. What Is Needed to Defend the Bipartisan Defense of Marriage Act of 1996?: Hearing 
Before the S. Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Prop. Rights of the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement ofHon. Russ Feingold, Member, S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary), http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=906. 
38. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201(2}--1207 (2003); id tit. 18, §§ 5160-5169 (2000). 
39. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 297-298 (West Supp. 2002); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 
§ 1261 (West 2000); CAL. Gov'T CODE§§ 22867-22877 (West 2004). 
40. See Cheryl Wetzstein, Same-Sex Couples 'Married' by City, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 13, 
2004, at AI. Boulder County, Colorado issued several marriage licenses to same-sex couples in 
1975. Ben Kieckhefer, Gay Marriage, What's New? Boulder County Issued Licenses in '75, 
THE MERCURY NEWS, Feb. 15, 2004, available at http://www.mercurynews.com/mld/ 
mercurynews/newsllocal/states/californialnorthern _ california/7961989 .htm. 
41. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003). That court 
subsequently reiterated that civil unions were insufficient-the state constitution demanded 
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This motley of experimentation and local governance is precisely the 
result that the Constitution's commitment to state power is designed to 
encourage. Different citizenries clearly want marriage defined or regulated 
in different ways. Accordingly, our federalist, multi-sovereign government 
normally ensures that the different state citizenries govern themselves, as 
they have shown themselves capable of doing. 
The FMA would disrupt this system. It nationalizes the definition of 
marriage and removes from the states (and their citizens) the power to 
define marriage for themselves. Under the FMA, states could not 
legislatively or constitutionally extend the definition of marriage to same-
sex couples. States could not experiment with constitutionally requiring that 
the benefits of marriage be extended to same-sex couples. Instead, marriage 
would be uniformly defmed by the national government, and the 
legislatures and people of the several states powerless to alter that 
nationalized meaning. The FMA would alter the Constitution's commitment 
to state power by abridging state power over the local concern of marriage. 
Constitutional provisions and amendments withdrawing power from the 
states are, of course, neither necessarily unwise nor unprecedented. Even a 
cursory reading of the Constitution evinces more than a few incursions on 
state power. However, as I explain, most of these withdrawals do so in 
furtherance of some other recognizable constitutional theme, such as liberty 
or equality. It is to these two particular themes that I tum next. 
B. Commitment to Liberty and Equality 
The themes of individual liberty and equality flow through the 
Constitution and its founding history. Fundamental rights and liberties, for 
the British, were creatures of law and inherently protected by Parliament.42 
American Whigs, however, holding a deep mistrust of government and fear 
oftyranny,43 rejected the theory that rights were created by Parliament alone 
because they saw Parliament as an uncontrollable tyrant, creating and 
destroying fundamental rights at whim.44 They also despised the nepotism 
nothing short of full marriage and marital benefits to same-sex couples. Opinions of the 
Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 567-72 (Mass. 2004). Massachusetts officials began 
issuing state-sanctioned same-sex marriage licenses on May 17, 2004. Yvonne Abraham & 
Rick Klein, Free to Marry: Historic Date Arrives for Same-Sex Couples in Massachusetts, 
BOSTON GLOBE, May 17, 2004, at A1. 
42. WOOD, supra note 14, at 262-65. 
43. !d. at 19-25. 
44. !d. at 265-66. 
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and governmental favor in British rule,45 instead supporting equality-or at 
least a measure of equality of opportunity sufficient to permit merit-based 
advancement.46 These were the rallying cries of the Revolution: "We hold 
these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; that they are 
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights; that among these 
are Life, Liberty and the pursuit ofHappiness."47 
The Constitution resulting from these ideals, though leaving to the states 
the vast residuum of power, explicitly restricts state power in favor of 
individual liberties and equality.48 It prevents states from passing bills of 
attainder, passing ex post facto laws, or impairing contracts;49 it assures trial 
by jury in · state criminal trials;50 and it prohibits one state from 
discriminating against citizens of another state. 51 (In a similar expression of 
individual rights vis-a-vis the national government, the Constitution also 
protects those accused of a federal crime by requiring a trial by jury,52 
mandating strict proof of treason, 53 and giving the President a broad 
pardoning power. 54) To embody Americans' dislike of social favoritism, 
45. !d. at 78-80. 
46. !d. at 70-72, 78. 
47. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. I (U.S. I776). 
48. Some debated whether state power was constrained by unmentioned natural rights 
principles. Compare, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 387-88 (I798) (Chase, J.): 
I cannot subscribe to the omnipotence of a State Legislature, or that it is 
absolute and without [control] .... There are certain vital principles in our 
free Republican governments, which will determine and over-rule an 
apparent and flagrant abuse of legislative power; as to authorize manifest 
injustice by positive law; or to take away that security for personal liberty, or 
private property, for the protection whereof the government was established. 
with id. at 399 (Iredell, J., concurring) ("If ... the Legislature of any member of the Union, shall 
pass a law, within the general scope of their constitutional power, the Court cannot pronounce it 
to be void, merely because it is, in their judgment, contrary to the principles of natural justice."). 
49. U.S. CONST. art. I, § IO ("No State shall ... pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto 
Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts .... ").James Madison asserted these to be 
"contrary to the first principles of the social compact, and to every principle of sound 
legislation .... Very properly, therefore, have the convention added this constitutional bulwark 
in favor of personal security and private rights." THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 282 (James 
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
50. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 ("The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of 
Impeachment, shall be by Jury .... "). 
51. !d. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and 
Immunities of Citizens in the several States."). 
52. !d. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 ("The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall 
be by Jury .... "). 
53. !d. art. III, § 3 (limiting the definition of treason and requiring either a confession in 
open court of the testimony of two witnesses for a conviction). 
54. !d. art. II, § 2, cl. I ("[H]e shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for 
Offenses against the United States .... "). Alexander Hamilton called the pardoning power a 
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Article I, section 10 prohibits the states from granting any "Title of 
Nobility."55 
In at least one respect, of course-slavery-the pre-Civil War 
Constitution was fundamentally anti-egalitarian.56 But this countervailing 
doctrine could not be peaceably maintained, and the resulting clash of the 
themes of equality, individual liberties, and state power led to the Civil 
War/7 which resolved the thematic clash against state power and in favor of 
individual rights and equality. After the Civil War, Congress passed and the 
states ratified the Thirteenth,58 Fourteenth,59 and Fifteenth Amendments,60 
which, for the first time since ratification of the original Constitution, took 
responsibility for protecting fundamental individual liberties and ensuring 
basic equality away from the states.61 
"benign prerogative" that "should be as little as possible fettered or embarrassed." THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 74, at 447 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
55. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 10. 
56. See id. art. I,§ 2, cl. 3 (counting slaves as three-fifths of a person); id. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 
(prohibiting Congress from banning the importation of slaves until 1808); id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 
(providing that escaped slaves must be returned to their owners). 
57. Many have argued that Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 403-09 (1856), 
which held that slaves were not citizens and Congress could not constitutionally free them, 
ushered in the Civil War. See J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional 
Law, Ill HAR.v. L. REv. 963, 976 (1998) (citing Dred Scott as the case that precipitated the 
Civil War); Greg Sergienko, Social Contract Neutrality and the Religion Clauses of the Federal 
Constitution, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1263, 1277 n.67 (1996) (suggesting that Dred Scott precipitated 
the Civil War); Sol Wachtler, Judicial Lawmaking, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 8 (1990) (noting that 
Dred Scott is considered by many to be the precipitator of the Civil War). 
58. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the 
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction."). 
59. !d. amend. XIV, § 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
!d. The Fourteenth Amendment also amended the Three-Fifths Clause. !d. § 2 ("Representatives 
shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting 
the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed."). 
60. !d. amend. XV, § I ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be 
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous 
condition of servitude."). 
61. This great shift in state power came into full effect very slowly. The Supreme Court 
began to parse the boundaries between individual liberty, equality, and state power and, in 
infamous cases such as Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), the Civil Rights Cases, 109 
U.S. 3 (1883), and the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872), construed that 
boundary in favor of state power. Even as late as 1927, Justice Holmes derided the Equal 
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The · Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment have provided some of the most celebrated cases 
before the Supreme Court. The Due Process Clause protects from state 
intrusion the vast majority of the individual liberties found in the Bill of 
Rights.62 Under the Equal Protection Clause, the Supreme Court 
desegregated state schools63 and helped usher in the revolutionary civil 
rights movement. The theme of equality extends to voting rights,64 
redistricting cases, 65 and interstate travel. 66 The Clause also began to merge 
with the theme of liberty, especially in cases concerning voting rights and 
intimate relationships, to turn the Due Process Clause into a bulwark for 
individual liberty. 67 
The Due Process Clause codifies a right to be left alone, a protection of 
individual liberty itself.68 In the name of due process, the Court has struck 
Protection Clause as the "last resort of constitutional arguments." Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 
208 (1927). In the industrial age following Reconstruction, the Court experimented with 
protecting economic liberty as a constitutional right under the Due Process Clause. See Lochner 
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) ("The general right to make a contract in relation to his 
business is part of the liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth Amendment ... . 
The right to purchase or to sell labor is part of the liberty proteCted by this amendment .... "). 
However, it was not until the heyday of the Warren Court, in the 1950s and 1960s, that 
constitutional equality and individual liberty took the forefront. See discussion infra pp. 795-96 
and accompanying notes. 
62. See Scott Dodson, The Metes and Bounds of State Sovereign Immunity, 29 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 721, 762-63 (2002). 
63. See Brown v. Bd. ofEduc., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
64. See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 
u.s. 533, 565-66 (1964). 
65. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962); see also Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 
381 (1963) (coining the phrase "one person, one vote"). 
66. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969). 
67. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454 (1972) (applying both equal 
protection and due process principles to invalidate a law banning distribution of contraceptives 
to unmarried persons); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621,626-27 (1969) (applying 
both principles to voting rights); Harper, 383 U.S. at 665-66 (same); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 
U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (construing the Due Process Clause of the Fifth .Amendment to have an 
equal protection component); see also, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy 
and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REv. 375, 383-85 (1985) (arguing that 
abortion laws violate the Equal Protection Clause, rather than the Due Process Clause). See 
generally Ira C. Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REv. 
981 (1979). 
68. This right had its underpinnings before the Warren Court. See, e.g., Nat'! Mut. Ins. Co. 
v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("Great 
concepts like ... 'liberty' ... were purposely left to gather meaning from experience. For they 
relate to the whole domain of social and economic fact, and the statesmen who founded this 
Nation knew too well that only a stagnant society remains unchanged."); Olmstead v. United 
States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("[T]he right to be let alone [is] the 
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men."); Meyer v. Nebraska, 
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down laws infringing an adult's right to watch obscene movies,69 laws 
infringing a prisoner's right to notice and a hearing before being committed 
to solitary confinement/0 and laws infringing the right to interstate travee1 
In the name of liberty, the Court has struck down state laws outlawing the 
distribution of contraceptives,72 miscegenation,73 abortion/4 and sodomy.75 
In these cases, although acknowledging that "marriage is a social relation 
subject to the State's police power,"76 in the name of liberty and equality, 
the Court invalidated state laws imposing too great a burden on the freedom 
of consenting adults to make their own choices in their intimate 
relationships. 77 
262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (asserting that liberty includes "the right of the individual to contract, 
to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, 
establish a home and bring up children . . . , and generally to enjoy those privileges long 
recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men"). 
It was the Warren Court, however, which gave the right its life. 
69. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
70. Wolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,564-66 (1974). 
71. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966); cf The Passenger Cases, 48 
U.S. (7 How.) 283, 408---{)9 (1849) (holding the taxing of alien passengers upon arrival in ports 
unconstitutional). 
72. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453-55; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,485 (1965). 
73. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967). 
74. See Planned Parenthood ofS.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,846 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 
410 u.s. 113, 152-54 (1973). 
75. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
76. Loving, 388 U.S. at 7. 
77. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562 ("Liberty protects the person from unwarranted 
government intrusions into a dwelling or other private places. . . . Liberty presumes an 
autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate 
conduct."); id. at 572 ("[L]iberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to 
conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex."); Casey, 505 U.S. at 849 ("[T]he 
Constitution places limits on a State's right to interfere with a person's most basic decisions 
about family and parenthood."); id. at 851 (stating that personal decisions relating to marriage, 
"are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the 
right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery 
of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were 
they formed under compulsion of the State"); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 206 (1986) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court ignores the fundamental interest persons have 
in determining "the nature of their intimate associations with others"); Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 
453 (asserting that "the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its 
own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional 
makeup" and that, as a result, "the right to privacy means ... the right of the individual, married 
or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally 
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child"); Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 
("The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to 
the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. Marriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man,' 
fundamental to our very existence and survival."); id. ("The Fourteenth Amendment requires 
that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations. Under 
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These cases vindicating individual liberty and equality are the roots of 
our modem conception of the Constitution. The Constitution is not simply a 
document favoring state power with limited exceptions for individual rights 
and equality. It is a strong defender of civil rights. No longer is the Equal 
Protection Clause the last resort of constitutional challenges. It has 
spearheaded an era of unprecedented tolerance78 for minorities,79 women,80 
and many other classes.81 No longer are the. states free to establish a state 
religion or beat confessions out of criminal suspects. The individual 
liberties protected by the Bill of Rights apply (in most part) to the states. 
The fundamental right to vote has been extended to eliminate discrimination 
on the basis of gender,82 adult age,83 and income.84 In this modem era, we 
firmly believe that the Constitution should and does protect us from 
unjustified governmental intrusion and discrimination. 
our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with the 
individual and cannot be infringed by the State."); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 ("Marriage is a 
coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being 
sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not 
political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects."). 
78. Perhaps Justice Brennan put the value of that tolerance best: "We are not an 
assimilative, homogeneous society, but a facilitative, pluralistic one, in which we must be 
willing to abide someone else's unfamiliar or even repellant practice because the same tolerant 
impulse protects our own idiosyncrasies." Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 141 (1989) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). · 
79. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text. 
80. In Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 139 (1872), the Court upheld an Illinois 
statute prohibiting women from practicing law. Justice Bradley wrote: "The paramount destiny 
and mission of women are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the 
law of the Creator." !d. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring). It was not until 1971 that the first 
gender classification was struck down. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971). The Court 
gradually eroded gender stereotypes by, for example, striking down a Utah law which required 
that parents support female children until age eighteen but males until age twenty-one. See 
Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15 (1975) (stating that the law was based on "old notions" of 
a woman's role in society). 
81. Most notably, the Equal Protection Clause protects against discrimination on the basis 
of alienage, Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 
382-83 (1971), and legitimacy, Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456,461-65 (1988). 
82. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall 
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex."). 
83. !d. amend. XXVI, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen 
years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any 
State on account of age."). 
84. !d. amend. XXIV, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any 
primary or other [federal] election ... shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or 
any State by reason offailure to pay any poll tax or other tax."). 
36:0783] PECULIAR FEDERAL MARRIAGE AMENDMENT 797 
Thus, where the Constitution (or at least the Court's interpretation of it) 
invalidates state laws, it normally does so in favor of civil rights.85 States 
may provide more individual protection from state power than the federal 
Constitution does, 86 but the Constitution invalidates state laws providing 
less individual protection than the federal constitutional floor. The 
Constitution does not, however, make a regular point of invalidating state 
laws that provide more individual protection than that federal floor. The 
Constitution protects liberty and equality; it does not disparage them. That 
Congress or the states may deny or disparage many rights unprotected by 
the Constitution is unquestionable; but it would be an upending change for 
the Constitution to force them to do so. 
That is precisely what the FMA would do. The FMA would add to the 
Constitution a provision which restricts the ability of the states to protect 
the fundamental right of marriage and discriminates against a class of 
persons with respect to that right. It would force Congress and the states to 
treat same-sex couples differently than opposite-sex couples in historically 
the most fundamental and intimate of ways-the association of marriage. It 
would enshrine, in stark fashion, tyranny and intolerance in a document 
otherwise understood to protect just the opposite. 
The FMA is similar to Colorado's infamous Amendment 2,87 struck 
down in 1996 by the Supreme Court's decision in Romer v. Evans.88 
Amendment 2 prohibited any Colorado state action designed specifically to 
protect homosexuals. 89 The Amendment had "the peculiar property of 
imposing a broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named group"90 
by permanently withdrawing from homosexuals, but no others, the ability to 
85. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 324 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(discussing the protections of the federalist system). 
86. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 8 (1995); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975) 
("[A] State is free as a matter of its own law to impose greater restrictions on police activity 
than those this Court holds to be necessary upon federal constitutional standards."); William J. 
Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REv. 489, 
495 (1977). 
!d. 
87. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b. 
88. 517 u.s. 620, 635-36 (1996). 
89. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b: 
[No Colorado state entity] shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, 
regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual 
orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise 
be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any 
minority status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of 
discrimination. 
90. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632. 
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seek legal protection from discrimination by statute.91 The Court could 
ascribe no motivation for Amendment 2 besides animus towards 
homosexuals.92 According to the Court, such a law was "unprecedented in 
our jurisprudence."93 
Like Amendment 2, the FMA would single out a specific group of 
people for the purpose of denying them fundamental rights afforded others. 
The FMA would deny them the right to marry whom they choose. It would 
treat same-sex couples as "different" in the eyes of the state. And it would 
eliminate the ability of same-sex couples to petition their own state 
government to protect their rights. If the Constitution invalidates 
Amendment 2 as inconsistent with its themes and tradition, then the FMA 
would create an unprecedented tension between itself and the rest of the 
document. Because it advances antithetical notions of liberty and equality, 
all at the expense of state power, the FMA would be a truly peculiar 
amendment to the Constitution. 
III. THE UNIQUENESS OF THE FMA 
That the FMA would be a peculiar amendment does not mean that it 
would also be a unique one. In the FMA' s case, however, it is unique when 
compared to the existing constitutional amendments. 
I mentioned above that the Constitution's commitment to state power is 
not inviolate. Indeed, a few provisions of the original Constitution remove 
power from the states just as the FMA would.94 Many that I have listed do 
so in furtherance of individual liberty or equality.95 The others do so in 
91. !d. at 627,631. 
92. !d. at 632. 
93. !d. at 633. 
94. See supra text accompanying notes 50-57. Others remove power from the states for 
the purpose of effectuating their power in state-state relationships. For example, the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV,§ 1, cl. 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each 
State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State."), protects the 
efficacy of one state's laws in other states without facially disparaging liberty or equality. So 
does the Privileges and Immunities Clause, id. § 2, cl. 1 ("The Citizens of each State shall be 
entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."), which also furthers 
the themes of individual liberty and equality. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 200 (1973) 
(discussing the Privileges and Immunities Clause); Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 
496, 511 (1939) (same); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180-81 (1868) (same); 
Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230) (same). The 
Extradition Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2, which requires states to extradite persons 
accused of a crime by another state, is somewhat contrary to individual liberty, but not 
particularly contrary to equality. These provisions exist principally to maintain amiable state-
state relationships, not to remove power from the states to the detriment of civil rights. 
95. See supra Part II. 
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furtherance of another important and recognizable constitutional theme: 
ensuring the efficacy or uniformity of national power.96 The Supremacy 
Clause97 and the exclusions in Article I, Section 10,98 for example, remove 
power from the states merely to strike the proper balance of power between 
federal and state legislation. They are not particularly contrary to individual 
liberty or equality. The so-called Dormant Commerce Clause, which 
prevents states from unduly burdening interstate commerce,99 does likewise, 
although the Dormant Commerce Clause actually furthers equality in 
practice because it is likely to invalidate a state law which discriminates 
against out-of-staters and unlikely to invalidate a state law which does not 
discriminate. 100 Although these provisions ·do take power away from the 
states, none does so in the antiliberty and anti-equality way that the FMA 
does. 
As I have mentioned, most of the amendments constrain governmental 
power in favor of individual liberty or equality. However, many other 
amendments in the Constitution further neither liberty nor equality. Several 
are housekeeping or structural amendments, such as the establishment of 
procedures for presidential succession,101 which promote workable 
government. These are readily distinguishable from the decidedly policy-
slanted FMA. The three remaining amendments, however-the Eleventh,102 
Sixteenth/03 and Eighteenth104-cannot be dismissed so readily, because 
each shares something in common with the FMA. Each abridges a specific 
individual liberty. To that extent, they, like the FMA, are also somewhat 
96. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 288 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
97. U.S. CoNST. art. VI,§ 1, cl. 2 (decreeing that federal law "shall be the supreme Law of 
the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or 
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding"). 
98. ld. art. I,§ 10. 
99. See S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rei. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 766-70, 783-84 (1945) 
(discussing principles of the Dormant Commerce Clause); S.C. State Highway Dep't v. 
Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 189-90 (1938) (same) .. 
100. See JulianN. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 
474-75 (1982) (reevaluating the Dormant Commerce Clause). 
101. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV. 
102. I d. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to 
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States 
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."). 
103. ld. amend. XVI ("The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, 
from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without 
regard to any census or enumeration."). 
104. ld. amend. XVIII, § 1 ("After one year from the ratification of this article the 
manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, 
or the exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited."). 
800 ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J. 
odd amendments. However, unlike the FMA, not one of them abridges all 
three themes I have articulated above-liberty, equality, and state power-
and the one which abridges two of the three was promptly repealed by 
another amendment. 105 Accordingly, the FMA, should it be ratified, would 
stand as the one constitutional provision to reduce state power to the 
detriment of individual liberty and equality. 
The Eleventh Amendment, 106 which restrains the judicial power of the 
United States in certain cases involving suits by private individuals against 
states, is similar to the FMA because it limits certain individuals' ability to 
sue a state and it facially discriminates between in-state and out-of-state 
plaintiffs. However, unlike the FMA, the Eleventh Amendment restores 
power to the states, rather than stripping the states of power, because, under 
the Eleventh Amendment, a state can choose to subject itself to suit if it 
wishes. 107 In addition, the Supreme Court has applied the Eleventh 
Amendment indiscriminately to both in-state and out-of-state plaintiffs. 108 
Accordingly, although on its face the Eleventh Amendment has some 
similarities to the FMA, it really only shares the FMA's antagonism 
towards individual liberty. 
The Sixteenth Amendment,109 which grants the federal government the 
power to impose an income tax, shares the same analogy. It in no way limits 
the power of the states to assess and collect income taxes. Nor does it 
discriminate against a class of citizens. The Sixteenth Amendment is 
essentially neutral on state power and neutral on equality. It does, of course, 
infringe upon individual rights to liberty and property. However, it does not 
share the other anticonstitutional slants that the FMA furthers. 
Perhaps the closest analogue to the FMA is the Eighteenth 
Amendment, 110 which ushered in Prohibition. The Eighteenth Amendment 
stripped the states of their traditional power to regulate alcoholic beverages 
and elevated Prohibition to constitutional stature, beyond the reach of 
government, much as the FMA purports to do ·with marriage. Unlike the 
FMA, however, the Eighteenth Amendment does not have much to do with 
equality, and, in any case, the Eighteenth Amendment was a social disaster 
105. /d. amend. XXI (repealing the Eighteenth Amendment). 
106. !d. amend. XL 
107. Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1887). 
108. E.g., Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 18-21 (1890) (recognizing that the Eleventh 
Amendment extends to out-of-state plaintiff suits and extending immunity to in-state plaintiff 
suits as well). 
109. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. The amendment overruled Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & 
Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895). 
110. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII,§ 1. 
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quickly repealed by the Twenty-First Amendment, 111 which restored the 
federalist structure. So perhaps I was wrong to say that the FMA is like 
nothing in the Constitution-it shares the dubious distinction of having its 
closest analogue be the only amendment ever repealed. 
IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF CONSTITUTIONALISM 
If it is sobering that the FMA purports to strip away state choice, 
individual liberty, and equality, all at the same time, it is particularly 
disturbing that it does so by federal constitutional amendment. 
There is a fundamental difference between legislation enacted by the 
government and constitutional provisions adopted by the people. The 
Framers, concerned with Parliament's control over individual rights, 
adopted a natural rights view, rather than a positivist one. 112 They believed 
that natural rights held by the people should be impervious to legislative 
encroachment. 113 Constitutionalism provided an answer by lodging the 
protection of certain fundamental rights and liberties with the people 
themselves and placing them beyond the reach of the government. 114 
Because constitutional provisions are unalterable by the government, 
nonprocedural amendments should be reserved for those "great and 
extraordinary occasions"115 for which the people need to rein in their 
government to prevent it from trampling on their rights. 116 Accordingly, the 
Framers intentionally made the Constitution difficult to amend, requiring 
the support of two-thirds of each House of Congress, plus ratification by 
three-fourths of the states. 117 Rare are those instances in which the need for 
amendment is so great to achieve the necessary support for passage and 
111. Id. amend. XXI. 
112. David M. Rabban, The Ahistorical Historian: Leonard Levy on Freedom of Expression 
in Early American History, 37 STAN. L. REv. 795, 828 (1985) (book review) (explaining that 
the new America "rejected Blackstone's positivist view of sovereignty as the binding command 
of a legislature imposing its will on the people" and instead maintaining "that sovereignty 
derived from the people's continuous assent"). 
113. EdwardS. Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law 
(pt. 2), 42 HARV. L. REv. 365, 368, 408-09 (1928). 
114. See WOOD, supra note 14, at 266, 275-76. 
115. THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 314 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
116. As Justice Blackmun has stated: "While there is much to be praised about our 
democracy, our country since its founding has recognized that there are certain fundamental 
liberties that are not to be left to the whims of an election." Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 943 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring & dissenting); accord Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 211 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("It is precisely because the 
issue raised by this case touches [upon] the heart of what makes individuals what they are that 
we should be especially sensitive to the rights of those whose choices upset the majority."). 
117. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
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ratification. Over 11,000 amendments have been proposed,118 yet only 
thirty-three have passed Congress, 119 and only twenty-seven have been 
ratified into law by the states. 120 One reason for the intentional difficulty of 
amendment is to prevent shortsighted amendments from undermining or 
conflicting with fundamental values and undercurrents existing in the rest of 
the Constitution. 121 As I have argued, the FMA contravenes this latter norm 
by competing against the themes of state power, liberty, and equality 
otherwise enshrined in the Constitution. 
Federal constitutional amendments are also intentionally difficult to 
prevent the tyranny of prior generations. Recent polls indicate that a slight 
majority of Americans supports a constitutional ban on same-sex 
marriages. 122 Why then, some may ask in the name of democracy, should 
the will of the people not be constitutionalized? Although the FMA may be 
supported now, its support correlates with age groups--older respondents 
are more likely to support the FMA than younger respondents. Indeed, a 
majority of those aged eighteen to twenty-nine actually opposes the FMA.123 
If the FMA were adopted today, in twenty years the FMA could exist even 
though a majority of Americans opposed it. The urgency with which 
proponents push the FMA suggests that they fear their time is dwindling, 
that younger generations may soon control the majoritarian sentiment. If so, 
this urgency "reflects a deeply anti-democratic impulse, a fundamental 
118. Sullivan, supra note 2, at 692. 
119. JOHN R. VILE, REWRITING THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION: AN EXAMINATION OF 
PROPOSALS FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO THE PRESENT 5 ( 1991 ). 
120. Some of the most notorious failed bids include amendments to address gender 
discrimination, require a balanced budget, limit congressional terms, prohibit flag burning 
(twice), allow a presidential line-item veto, abolish the electoral college, outlaw abortion, 
prohibit remedial school busing, grant the District of Columbia statehood, and authorize school 
prayer. See RICHARD B. BERSTEIN & JEROME AGEL, AMENDING AMERICA: IF WE LOVE THE 
CONSTITUTION So MUCH, WHY Do WE KEEP TRYING To CHANGE IT? 142-43 (1993) 
(discussing the Equal Rights Amendment); Sullivan, supra note 2, at 691-94 (surveying 
proposed constitutional amendments). 
121. Sullivan, supra note 2, at 697 (discussing the "dangers that tinkering with the parts 
poses to the coherence of the whole"); id. at 700 ("But it is clear that amendments can cause 
tension with the original document, and may exert a gravitational force extending beyond their 
specific subject matter. This is at least an additional argument for keeping amendments to an 
essential minimum."). The difficulty of amendment also promotes stability and preserves the 
rule of law by distinguishing constitutional values from mere legislation. !d. at 695-96; see also 
THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 278 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (cautioning 
"against that extreme facility, which would render the Constitution too mutable"). 
122. Seelye & Elder, supra note 2, at 1 (reporting that 55% favor and 40% oppose an 
amendment). 
123. !d. (reporting that that age cohort opposes an amendment, 52% to 44%). 
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distrust of normal political processes. "124 One should not "believe that one 
generation is not as capable as another of taking care of itself, and of 
ordering its own affairs."125 
Even if, as some assert, it is the state courts, rather than the people or the 
legislatures, which are defining marriage, 126 the federalist system is 
designed to replace unpopular state court decisions through the state-not 
the federal-democratic process. If a state citizenry disagrees with its 
court's interpretation of its constitution, it can elect different judges or 
amend its own constitution to correct the court's interpretation. 127 Resorting 
to the state constitutional process is precisely what Alaska, Hawaii, and 
other states have done. 128 In this way, the citizenry of each state can 
124. What Is Needed To Defend the Bipartisan Defense of Marriage Act of 1996?: Hearing 
Before the S. Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Prop. Rights of the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003) (testimony of Prof. Dale Carpenter, Univ. of Minn. Law 
Sch.), http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=906. 
125. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in The PORTABLE 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 552, 559 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1975). 
126. Bork, supra note 3, at A14. Such sentiments are reminiscent of the reactions of many 
to the Supreme Court's desegregation cases. After Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 
(1954), ninety-six southern congressmen issued the following denouncement: 
We regard the decision of the Supreme Court in the school cases as clear 
abuse of judicial power. It climaxes a trend in the Federal judiciary 
undertaking to legislate, in derogation of the authority of Congress, and to 
encroach upon the reserved rights of the states and the people. 
The original Constitution does not mention education. Neither does the 
Fourteenth Amendment nor any other amendment. 
Though there has been no constitutional amendment or act of Congress 
changing this established legal principle almost a century old, the Supreme 
Court of the United States, with no legal basis for such action, undertook to 
exercise their naked judicial power and substituted their personal political 
and social ideas for the established law of the land. 
We decry the Supreme Court's encroachments on rights reserved to the 
states and to the people, contrary to established law and to the Constitution. 
We commend the motives of those states which have declared the 
intention to resist forced integration by any lawful means. 
Text of96 Congressmen's Declaration on Integration, N.Y. TiMES, Mar. 12, 1956, at 19. 
127. Most states are not shy about amending their constitutions. In contrast to the federal 
Constitution's twenty-seven amendments, Alabama's constitution has been amended over 700 
times; California's over 500; and Texas's over 300. ALA. CONST. amends. I-DCCLXXXVI; 
Daniel Sneider, California Reformers Swipe at Beloved Ballot Initiatives, CHRISTIAN Scr. 
MONITOR, May 30, 1996, at 3 (reporting that "California's Constitution has been amended 492 
times since it was enacted in 1879"); http://www.lrl.state.tx.us/legis/constAmends/lrlhome.cfm 
(updated Feb. 2004) ("[T]he Texas Constitution has been amended 432 times since its adoption 
in 1876."). 
128. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text. 
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consider and select a definition of marriage most suited to its own 
sentiments. Federal amendment is a particularly crude way of correcting 
perceived judicial activism on the state level. 129 Should the FMA be ratified, 
those states in the supermajority could impose their definition of marriage 
on nonratifying states, even if the nonratifying states had codified a 
different definition of marriage through a nonjudicial process such as 
legislation or state constitutional amendment. 
Federal constitutional amendments are not mere legislation. They are 
difficult because they are special. As a general rule, nonstructural 
amendments should be employed only to restrict government power, only to 
vindicate civil rights or notions of equality. The FMA does not fit that bill. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The FMA, despite its popular support, would tum the Constitution in a 
new direction, away from some of the most important themes it enshrines. 
There are dangers for appending such a peculiarity. Provisions embodying 
contrary themes cause internal tension and perhaps difficulty with 
interpretation. One of the beauties of the document is its relative coherence; 
the themes are recognizable and, for the most part, consistent. The FMA 
would bring a drastic change to these themes and may have consequences 
for their future interpretation that radiate far beyond the FMA' s intended 
effect. We should always be cautious before amending the Constitution. We 
should be especially cautious with the FMA. 
129. Never have the American people used a federal constitutional amendment to reverse a 
state court's interpretation of its own state's constitution or laws. Lea Brilmayer, Full Faith and 
Credit, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 2004, at Al6. 
